Economic agents have the possibility to fund the protection of environmental public goods, such as natural ecosystems and biodiversity, facing unknown risks of collapse, which could help to back them up. On the base of the prediction markets, which meet with a degree of success since their introduction, we propose an evolutionary model of an option fund market for the threshold environmental public goods. We consider population dynamics of agents distributed into proportional fair-share contributors and free-riders. The model outcomes show that the public goods could be provided when the agents exchanging option contracts are equally divided into buyers and sellers. This result only holds for a specific social belief over the probability of the public good safeguard and the strict equality between bids and asks. Otherwise, providing public goods through option markets turns out to be inoperative.
Introduction
When the economic agents are exposed to uncertain risks of collapse of the environmental public goods such as ecosystems, which provide a number of goods and services to human societies, they are faced with the option of funding their conservation. For example, climate change has produced shifts in the distribution and abundance of biodiversity (Thomas et al. 2004, Wright and Muller-Landau 2006) ; a number of biological species are likely to disappear and some of them face extinction before even being identified (Schelling 1992) . And yet, the ecosystem and biodiversity conservation can be beneficial for many reasons, one of which is their high option value Fisher 1974, Chivian and Bernstein 2004) .
To estimate the monetary value of changes in risk probabilities, economists use contingent valuation (Acton 1973 , Jones-Lee et al. 1985 , Thompson et al. 1984 , wherein the metric is the willingness-to-pay for reducing a particular risk (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1996) . Weinstein et al. (1980) find that the willingness-to-pay for a mortality reduction is contingent on the reduction amount and the initial probability level. Despite a positive expected value of reductions in the risk, papers show a significant sequential diminishment of this value (Viscusi et al. 1987, Hammitt and Graham 1999) . Indeed, agents are discouraged by the environmental uncertainty and fear that their contributions be a waste (Au 2004) . This leads to a steady decline in contributions (Gangadharan and Nemes 2009 ).
In principle, agents have the incentive to avoid contributing and to free-ride on the provisions coming from the contributing agents, that is, they attempt to exploit the common enterprise, as contributors provide benefit to the others while inflicting a personal sacrifice.
Indeed, an agent has to reduce her wealth for another to increase hers (Dreber and Nowak 2008) . This rationale leads to the well-known social dilemmas (Bach et al. 2006 , Hauert et al. 2006 , Milinski et al. 2008 , Wang et al. 2009 , Wang et al. 2010 .
Through the population dynamics in replication, we are interested in the capacity of agents to jointly produce environmental threshold public goods, through option fund markets, when they face unknown probabilities of success. Evolutionary dynamics (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998) is helpful as it introduces cooperation. In parallel, population dynamics is relevant for the reason that the coordination of the entire population is necessary to produce the public good. We aim to confront proportional fair-share contributors, who donate the minimum average amount, with free-riders, who do not contribute. Specifically, threshold public goods are provided if joint fair-share contributions equal or exceed the required threshold level of provisions; otherwise, no public good is provided.
We propose an evolutionary model of an option market for the provision of environmental public goods such as the endangered species. We consider an unknown risk of species loss and uncertain individual expected wealth from its safeguard. The review of evolutionary models applied to public goods can be found in Archetti and Scheuring (2011) .
Because exchanges are based upon predictions, our option fund market can be thought of as a prediction market. Prediction markets are those where agents exchange contracts whose payoffs are tied to the outcomes of unknown events; through prices, the market aims to reveal the social beliefs over those events. Link and Scott (2005) show that a prediction market can be used to value the success of governmental research projects. Prediction markets can also assist public institutions in managing social risks such as environmental disasters (Arrow et al. 2008 ).
There are currently several policy mechanisms available to improve the environmental effectiveness, such as one-off offsets, in-lieu fees and biobanking or conservation markets (OECD 2013 , OECD 2014 . The latter sends out biodiversity credits which can be bought and sold, generating funds for the environmental management. There is often a strong overlap across these alternative mechanisms. Nevertheless, these payment mechanisms operate in a deterministic context. We thus wish to investigate the suitability of prediction markets, as an answer to the uncertainty of events, in fulfilling the role assigned to the conservation markets.
In an efficient prediction market, the market price predicts the probability of occurrence (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004) . Thereby, in the political domain, Berg et al. (2008) document that prediction markets yield accurate predictions. Nevertheless, a widespread behavioral bias of agents is to trade according to their subjective beliefs and desires, rather than objective probability assessments (Forsythe et al. 1999) . This is all the more interesting in our case, for the species safeguard probability is considered as unknown. By entering the market, the agent who decides to trade options at a certain probability level reveals her beliefs over the species safeguard and the likelihood of attaining the required threshold.
The prediction market can be considered a representative model-agent with a set of expectations (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004) . Even though the equilibrium price does not truly reveal the mean belief that agents hold, it yields a bound on this belief (Manski 2006) .
Nevertheless, there is a difference between the standard prediction markets and our option fund market framework: the latter does not produce outcomes tied to exogenous events.
Indeed, option exercises depend on the number of betting exchanges cleared on the market. If agents conclude an insufficient number of option contracts, they fail to provide the environmental public good and the species safeguard is put in danger. In turn, buyers fall salvaging their wealth through, and sellers lose their premium from bearing the risk of the public good loss.
In the static version of the option market game, we find that selling option contracts dominates in case of null probability of safeguard. In uncertainty, agents exchanging option contracts at the market equilibrium equally split between buyers and sellerswhich in turn enables to fund the public goodonly if the proportional fair-share amounts to the expected wealth at the market price. In the dynamic version of the game, sellers of option contracts are in steady state when the probability of safeguard is zero. In case of unknown probability of safeguard, there exists a unique stable interior Nash equilibrium, where agents exchanging option contracts achieve to provide the public good. This is verified under two conditions: (1) through the option market, the society funds the public good at the expected value; (2) all the bids equal all the asks. Otherwise, sellers outnumber buyers, which condemns the option market to inactivity.
Section 2 provides a detailed description of the option fund market model. Conclusive remarks are given in Section 3.
Option fund market model

2.1.Compound probability
Consider a case of endangered species which stochastic safeguard depends on the collection of funds intended to initiate a public conservation policy. The funding of this project is left to the goodwill of economic agents. With respect to this uncertain environmental public good, an agent, who thus has to decide whether or not to participate in financing, deals with three consecutive bets, which will ultimately reveal her beliefs over the public good.
The first bet relates to eventuality that the species has an option value; the second bet relates to the uncertainty of attaining, through the option market funding, the public good threshold, which would secure the species safeguard; her third bet is about the risk of wealth loss, which she bears from the extinction of the endangered species. Therefore, we need to consider three respective independent lotteries A, B and C, which encompass the respective bets. 
The probability of provision of the public good and thus of the agent expected salvage of wealth amounts to
where pq  
. Provided that the probability of the option value existence and the probability of loss in utility from its extinction are independent 2 from the probability of the 1 We ignore the case of (1 ) p   on purpose. Indeed, contrary to  and q, the probability p of species safeguard depends on whether the agent decides to contribute to the public good. This bet is under her control.
2 Indeed, both the option value and the risk of payoff loss pre-exist to the market funding.
threshold attainment, the joint probability of species safeguard is p. As a result, we have ( | ) p q p   , and () w  reduces to () pw. In other words, an agent who decides to bet on the species safeguard through the option market considers its option value and her loss in wealth as statement of facts.
In what follows, we consider the context of uncertainty through [0,1] p  , as the probability of safeguard remains unknown after an agent contributed to the environmental public good. Indeed, the contributing agent ignores whether there is a free-rider among other agents, who might have jeopardized the threshold attainment.
Static game
Let 0 w  be the agent endowment or amount of wealth and g her contribution to the public good. Suppose the existence of an option market for the public good, where infinity of M agents exchange option contracts until the market price is settled. Buying agents bid, while selling agent ask. Agents bid if they believe that the species safeguard is high or 0.5 p  , and ask otherwise. We assume that the threshold level G can only be attained at the market equilibrium, where all possible exchanges are cleared at the market price; the market then equally splits between m buyers (bidders) and Mm  sellers (askers).
If all the bid-ask spreads are zero, that is, bids and offers match or /2 m M m m M     , the option market is considered to be fully efficient and the threshold can be attained. Therefore, to attain the threshold, all contributing agents, that is, half of the population, must contribute their proportional fair-share
proportional fair-share is a fair-share proportional to the social risk [0,1] k  of suffering from the public good loss. By means of prevalence proportion, we know that the probability of an agentrandomly picked from the populationof being at risk is equal to the proportion of the population which is considered to be at risk. When 1 k  , the whole population is at risk, so the proportional fair-share equals 1 GM  . As 0 k  , the proportion of population at risk rarefies, so it becomes increasingly expensive for an agent to fund the public good for the whole collectivity.
In terms of the expected payoff matrix, we have Buyer Seller
Buyers willing to secure the probability of species safeguard offer to buy option contracts at their willingness-to-pay, i.e. their proportional fair-share, whereas sellers unconvinced of the safeguard likelihood propose to sell contracts at their willingness-to-accept. If a buyer happens to meet a buyer, their contracts are not exchanged and both face the risk of 1 p  of losing their wealth. The same holds with two asks. Otherwise, the buyer salvages her wealth at p by bidding her proportional fair-share; the seller receives a premium of  for her asking price. The option price thus corresponds to p . If m M m  and /2 mM  , the payoffs of a buyer and a seller facing an unknown probability of species safeguard are 11 (1 )(
Null probability of safeguard
When the species safeguard is believed to be unattainable or show that they are negative: the risk premiums turn out to be negative. Despite appearances, this result is not absurd, and is known to exist in the capital asset pricing model. Analyzing premiums for public good losses resumes to studying a context where property rights are passed over. In our case, the agent has to consider herself the owner of the public good from which she loses her wealth. Asking for compensation demanded for the public loss, even in case of private fatalities, makes de facto selling agents creditors of the public good. And we know, for example, that the risk premium can be negative with credit default option swap contracts. As a result, when agents decide to sell option contracts on the public good, they ask the market to protect them, in exchange of a premium, from their potential loss of wealth, so buyers of option contracts become sellers of the protection contracts. Given that scarcity is highly valued on markets, the lower the population risk is, the higher the premium gets.
Subsequently, as 0 k  , the cost of protecting oneself through the option fund market becomes excessive.
On the contrary, when k and p tend to 1, option prices are close to zero: the expected benefit of the buyer, from providing the public good, moves toward her proportional fairshare. In this case, the option fund market fails to be surplus-generating, and the game is solved with public demand and supply which never meet. Although the option market mechanism can be efficient enough to equalize the expected benefits and costs, it produces no-surpluses at the equilibrium, which can be considered as absurd with respect to the market paradigm. Given that no buyer will accept to contribute unless her benefit from the public good overpasses her cost of funding it, and given that no seller will accept to exchange at a negative price unless she asks the market to protect her from the risk of wealth loss, the conservation market operates under the no-surplus condition in uncertainty (Gale 2000) .
Evolutionary game
Assume infinite subpopulations of m buyers and
Mm  sellers in the population. Let
denote the ratio of buyers to sellers. The evolution of the system is given by the following differential equations () 
The probability for a model-buyer to be allocated the exchange is
. Indeed, the model-seller chooses a model-buyer at random when more than one. Following the works of Bach et al. (2006) and Julien et al. (2008) , the probability for a buyer to be served when selecting a seller is given by 3
is the probability that model-agents do not match, i.e. all the market surplus is captured by the supply side. Given the agents present in the market,
is the probability that the model-buyer finds the right model-seller. The probability that the modelseller sells an option contract is 1 (1 ) M z 
. The average payoffs of a model-buyer and a model-seller become
The differential equations yield a single formulation in form of
So the dynamic evolution of () zt amounts to 
11
The study of the evolutionary dynamics yields the following.
Proposition 3. In case of null probability of the environmental public good safeguard, sellers of option contracts are in steady state and the threshold good fails to be provided.
Proof. Solving 0 z  gives two fixed points of the replicator dynamics that cancel out (1 ) zz  : 0 z  , which stands for a preponderance of sellers, and 1 z  where the market is equally divided between buyers and sellers. The derivative of () Fz is
The stability of equilibria is provided in Table 1 . Figure 3 illustrates the evolutionary dynamics. 
Unknown probability of safeguard
When the belief is unknown or 01 p  , we have
From the study of the evolutionary dynamics, the following proposition ensues.
Proposition 4. In case of unknown probability of the environmental public good safeguard, there exists a unique stable interior Nash equilibrium * z , where the threshold good achieves to be provided, when the social belief is the expected value and bids and asks coincide.
Otherwise, the option fund market is inoperative.
Proof. Fixing 0 z  gives two fixed points: 0 z  and 1 z  . The derivative of ()
At 0 z  , (0) 0 F  , that is, a stable equilibrium. At 1 z  , (1) 0
F
. When the inequality Figure 4 and Figure 5 give an overview of the replicator dynamics with respect to the tradeoff rule. As 1 z  , the option price tends to the value of the proportional fair-share. Finally, we note that model-agents can attain the threshold level when 0.5 p  and 1 gk   , be two necessary and sufficient conditions under which the population of agents ends up being equally divided into buyers and sellers. Thereby, if the social belief is different from the expected value and if bids and asks differ, 5 selling will always rule. As a consequence, the option market will remain inactive. 
